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Abstract
In this paper, we use administrative data on tax returns to characterize the distributions
of before- and after-tax income, tax liabilities and tax credits in Spain for individuals
and households. We use the most recent available data, 2015 for individuals and 2013
for households, but also discuss how the income distribution and taxes have changed
since 2002. We also estimate effective tax functions that capture the underlying hetero-
geneity of the data in a parsimonious way. These parametric functions can be used to
calculate after-tax incomes in surveys where this information is not directly available,
and can also be used in quantitative work in macroeconomics and public finance.
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1 Introduction
This paper makes two contributions. First, we use administrative data on tax returns
to characterize the distributions of before- and after-tax income, tax liabilities and
tax credits in Spain. We also calculate effective average and marginal tax rates that
individuals and households face. We use the most recent available data, 2015 for
individuals and 2013 for households, but also discuss how the income distribution
and taxes have changed since 2002. Second, we provide estimates of effective tax
functions. These functions map gross incomes of individuals or households into taxes
that they pay, summarizing the complicated structure of taxes in easy-to-interpret and
easy-to-use parametric forms. As such, they provide valuable inputs for quantitative
studies of fiscal policy in models with heterogeneous agents.1,2 Our approach follows
Gouveia and Strauss (1994), Heathcote et al. (2017) and Guner et al. (2014), who
estimate tax functions of the US personal income tax. Calonge and Conesa (2003)
provide estimates of effective tax functions for Spain for the early 1990s.
Our data come from an administrative dataset containing a stratified random sample
of tax returns, which includes a large set of fiscal and socio-demographic information
that taxpayers provide in their returns.3 The dataset is representative of the population
of Spanish taxpayers and income variables are not censored, which makes it ideal for
our purposes. The dataset has both a cross section and a panel component. Repeated
cross sections are available from 2002 to 2015, and they have a large sample size.
The 2015 sample contains 2.7 million observations, about 14% of the population. It
is not possible, however, to match household members, a husband and wife, who file
individual tax returns, in this dataset. The panel dataset covers the period 1999–2013
and has a smaller sample size, but allows us to link individual tax filers from the same
household, and compute taxes at the household level.4
1 Heathcote et al. (2009) and Krueger et al. (2016) provide recent reviews of this literature. For quantitative
macro studies on the Spanish tax and transfer system, see, among others, Rojas (2005), González and
Pijoan-Mas (2006), Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2009), Sánchez Martín and Sánchez Marcos (2010),
Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2017) and Guner et al. (2018).
2 An alternative is the microsimulation approach that simulates the incidence of tax reforms on a rep-
resentative sample of taxpayers. Microsimulation models can be either non-behavioral or behavioral.
Non-behavioral ones are accounting models that simply simulate the taxpayers’ tax liabilities taking into
account the design of the tax code (e.g., statutory rates, tax benefits, etc.). As such, they ignore the response
of individuals to the tax changes, e.g., changes in the labor supply that might result from changes in taxes.
While behavioral models rely on an accounting model, which computes net incomes under different choices
and tax structures, they also contain behavioral microeconometric models that allow for such responses. The
microsimulation approach can be used to estimate the consequences of very detailed tax reforms, since the
accounting model provides an in-depth characterization of the tax code. However, this type of evaluations
is usually carried out in partial equilibrium, since the exhaustive depiction of the tax system is difficult to
integrate in macro models featuring general equilibrium. See Labeaga et al. (2008) for an evaluation of
personal income tax reforms in Spain under a behavioral microsimulation approach and Peichl (2016) for
a discussion of the linking between microsimulation and computational general equilibrium models.
3 The data cover 15 Spanish regions and 2 autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla). Two Spanish regions,
the Basque Country and Navarre, have their own independent tax collection authority and are not included
in the dataset.
4 Based on the same data, Haugh and Martínez-Toledano (2017) analyze the income distribution, taxes and
tax benefits for the period 2002–2011. They assess differences in such distributions by gender and province
and focus on changes before and after the economic crisis.
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The key takeaways from our analysis of the data are as follows: First, the data exhibit
a significant degree of inequality, in both incomes and tax liabilities. The bottom (top)
quintile of the income distribution accounts for about 4.6% (47.1%) of gross income,
and the share accounted for by the top 1% is about 9.5%. A similar picture emerges for
households. The top (bottom) quintiles account for 4.4% (49.9%) of gross income, and
the top 1% accounts for 9.7% of gross income. The Gini coefficients for individual and
household gross incomes are 0.42 and 0.45, respectively. Second, given the progressive
tax system in Spain, tax liabilities are even more unequally distributed. The top quintile,
which accounts for 47.1% of gross income, pays about 73.2% of taxes, while the share
of the top 1% in total tax liabilities is 21%. As a result, the after-tax income distribution
is more equal than the before-tax income distribution. The shares of the top quintile
and top 1% of taxpayers in after-tax individual income decline to 42.8% and 7.6%,
respectively. The Gini coefficients for after-tax income are 0.38 for individuals and
0.40 and households. Our analysis also shows that the Gini coefficients for both before-
and after-tax incomes have been fairly stable since 2002. Other measures of income
inequality, such as 90-to-10 and 50-to-10 income ratios, however, did increase since
the 2008 crisis. Our estimates of the household income distribution are quite similar to
the ones we obtain from the Bank of Spain’s Survey of Household Finances (Encuesta
Financiera de las Familias or the EFF).5
Third, labor income constitutes the most important source of total income for most
households. Even at the top quintile, it represents about 87.1% of total income. The
capital and self-employment income, on the other hand, account for a more significant
share of total income for the top 1% of taxpayers. About 24.1% and 12.7% of their total
income come from capital and self-employment income, respectively. Interestingly,
capital and self-employment incomes also account for a large share of income at the
lower end of the income distribution. Fourth, we find that higher-income quintiles
enjoy larger tax deductions, which lower their taxable income, and larger tax credits,
which lower their tax liabilities. The top quintile, for example, accounts for 25.2% of all
deductions and 28% of all credits. The same numbers for the bottom quintile are 16.1%
and 4.9%, respectively. This reflects both the fact that some benefits, such as deductions
due to social security contributions or due to contributions to private pension plans,
are enjoyed more by richer households, and the fact that poorer households are more
likely to reach quickly zero tax liabilities due to deductions and credits.
Finally, there is also a large dispersion in effective average tax rates that individuals
face. About 37% of all taxpayers do not pay any taxes. Indeed, effective rates are close
to zero in the two lowest quintiles. The top quintile faces an average effective tax rate
of 19.0%, while the tax rate for the top 1% is 30.6%.
The tax system in Spain taxes the so-called general income, which mainly consists
of labor and self-employment income, and savings income, which mainly consists
of capital income, at different rates. Taxes on general income are higher and more
progressive than taxes on savings income.6 Hence, to each of these income categories
certain deductions are applied and then the corresponding tax liabilities are calculated.
5 Anghel et al. (2018) provide an analysis of changes in income, consumption and wealth distribution in
Spain in recent years.
6 López-Laborda et al. (2018) discusses how this dual tax system creates incentives for the taxpayers to
shift their income base from labor to capital.
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Tax liabilities corresponding to these two categories are then summed, and tax credits
are applied to the total tax liabilities to figure out what the taxpayer owes to the state.
Given this structure, for the estimation of the effective tax function, we follow two
different approaches. First, we estimate one single function for the final tax liabilities
as a function of gross income for each year between 2002 and 2015. We focus on two
different specifications: one proposed by Benabou (2002) and Heathcote et al. (2017),
which we call the HSV specification, and the GS specification, used by Gouveia and
Strauss (1994). In our estimation we account for the fact that low incomes are subject
to zero effective tax rates, and estimate an income threshold below which tax liabilities
are zero. In the second approach, we estimate three different functions: a function that
relates general income to general tax rates; a second function that links the savings
income to the savings tax rates; and a third function that accounts for the amount of
tax credits as a function of total gross income. We show that both approaches result
in tax functions that accurately estimate both the level and the distribution of the tax
liabilities observed in the data. As an illustration of the use of these tax functions, we
apply them to the EFF survey data and calculate after-tax incomes for each household,
a variable not available in the original survey.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Spanish
Personal Income Tax. Section 3 describes the dataset and lays out the definitions
and sample restrictions. Section 4 presents the basic facts of the income and tax
distributions. Section 5 presents the parametric estimates of the tax functions. Section 6
presents the basic facts of the after-tax income distributions for administrative and
survey data. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Spanish personal income tax
2.1 Overview
The Spanish Personal Income Tax (PIT) or Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas
Físicas (IRPF) taxes the income of Spanish residents.7 Table 1 documents different
sources of tax revenue for Spain, Euro Area and the OECD countries in 2015. The
total tax collection with the PIT is 7.2% of the GDP and 21% of total tax revenue in
Spain. It represents the second largest source of tax revenue after the social security
contributions. As a fraction of GDP, Spain collects around 2.2 and 1.3 percentage points
less revenue from the PIT than the Euro Area and the OECD averages, respectively.8
The tax is withheld at source and each year, between April and June, taxpayers
must file a tax return based on the previous calendar year’s total income. In 2015, all
taxpayers with a labor income above e22,000, or with a capital income (excluding
income from real-estate) above e1600, or with a real-estate income above e1000,
or with any income from self-employment had to file a tax return. Many taxpayers
7 Income subject to the PIT corresponds to worldwide income, although a number of bilateral agreements
eliminate double taxation.
8 See Hernández de Cos and López-Rodríguez (2014) and López-Rodríguez and García Ciria (2018) for
a description of income and social security taxes in Spain in the context of the European Union and the
OECD.
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Table 1 Distribution of tax revenues in 2015 (% of GDP). Source: OECD tax statistics (https://doi.org/10.
1787/data-00262-en)
Tax revenue
(%)
Personal
income tax
(%)
Social security
contributions
(%)
Value added
taxes (%)
Other
taxes (%)
PIT
Tax revenue
(%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spain 33.8 7.2 11.4 6.4 8.8 21.3
Euro area 11 38.8 9.4 12.2 7.0 10.2 24.3
OECD 34.0 8.5 8.9 6.7 9.8 24.5
The personal income tax column corresponds to the category 1100 taxes on income, profits and capital
gains of individuals of the OECD classification of taxes. The Euro area and the OECD averages exclude
Spain
below the labor income threshold, around 81% of them in 2015, still choose to file a
tax return, since they are likely to obtain a refund due to tax credits. Tax returns can
be filed single or jointly. Single tax returns are filed at the individual level, whereas
joint tax returns can be filed by spouses or single-parent families with at least one
dependent child.
Figure 1 provides a simplified version of the 2015 tax code. Income subject to the
tax can be of several types: labor income, capital income (both from financial assets
and real-estate) and self-employment income. From these gross income sources, a set
of deductible expenses can be subtracted, which include social security contributions
paid by the employee, a deduction for earning any labor income and business expenses
associated with self-employment.9 The result of this subtraction results in adjusted
gross income.
Adjusted gross income is then grouped into two categories, which are subsequently
taxed at different rates. The first type of income is called general income and includes
labor income, self-employment income and some forms of capital income (mainly,
income from real-estate).10 The second type of income is called savings income and
includes the main forms of capital income (e.g., realized capital gains, dividend pay-
ments and interest income).11 To each type of income, a set of tax deductions are
applied. Deductions that can be applied to general income include a tax deduction for
couples filing jointly and contributions to private pension plans.12 If the total deduc-
tions exceed the general income, taxpayers can apply some of the remaining deductions
to the savings income. The subtraction of these deductions from general and savings
income results in concepts called general taxable income and savings taxable income.
9 There are two deductions for earning labor income. First, all taxpayers are eligible for ae2000 deduction.
Second, an additional deduction of up toe3700 is given to taxpayers whose labor income is belowe14,450.
These quantities are further increased for some groups of taxpayers, such as disabled workers, or unemployed
who had moved to a different location in order to start a new job.
10 Other forms of capital income that are in general income include incomes that come from the participation
in common property regimes and other civil associations, such as unsettled estates or communities of
property owners.
11 In 2015, savings income covered slightly more than 60% of total capital income.
12 In 2015, the deduction on couples filing jointly amounted to e3400, while the limit on contributions to
private pension plans was set to e8000.
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Fig. 1 Structure of the Spanish personal income tax (2015)
General and savings taxable incomes are then taxed according to different tax
schedules. The tax schedules are split into a state and a region portion, since around
half of the tax revenue is transferred to the regions, which are entitled to design their
tax schedules and introduce their own tax benefits.13 In 2015, the state general tax
schedule consisted of 5 tax brackets and a top marginal rate of 22.5%. The regional
general tax schedule, which is applied on top of the state one, varies across regions.
For example, the tax schedule in Catalonia (the largest Spanish region in terms of GDP
in 2015) consisted of 6 tax brackets and a top marginal tax rate of 25.5%, whereas
that of the Community of Madrid (the second largest region) has 5 tax brackets and
a top marginal rate of 21.0%. Therefore, taxpayers in Catalonia faced a top marginal
rate of 48% (22.5% + 25.5%), while Madrid taxpayers were subject to a top marginal
rate of 43.5% (22.5% + 21.0%). The savings tax schedule is much less progressive.
In 2015, the state portion consisted of 3 brackets and a top marginal rate of 11.5%,
whereas the region portion, which did not differ across regions, comprised 3 brackets
and a top rate of 12.0%. Figure 2 shows the tax schedules in the two selected regions
in 2015.
Gross tax liabilities, which are calculated by applying state and region tax schedules
to general and savings taxable income, are then reduced by a series of tax credits. First,
a family allowance is subtracted from the gross tax liabilities from general taxable
income. The amount of the family allowance depends on the characteristics of the
13 In practice, the Spanish system of regional financing is complex, see de la Fuente (2010) for a detailed
description. Roughly speaking, regions keep 25% of their tax collection and either receive or contribute
money in net terms from two funds aiming at ensuring sufficient financing for each region and a homogenous
provision of public services deemed essential, such as health and education. Regions can also raise money
from financial markets by issuing debt.
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Notes: This figure shows the statutory marginal tax rates of the personal income tax in 2015 for residents in Catalonia and Madrid.
Panel A displays the rates applied to general income. Panel B shows the tax rates of savings income.
Fig. 2 Statutory marginal tax rates (2015)
taxpayer and their family, such as age, number of dependent children, number of
dependent parents and disability status of the taxpayer and other family members.14
The actual amount that is subtracted from gross tax liabilities is calculated by applying
the general tax schedules to the family allowance. For example, if the total family
allowance is e5500, which is below the first income threshold in panel A of Figure 2,
then tax liabilities are reduced by e5500 × 0.095 = e522.5. If the general taxable
income of a taxpayer is less than their family allowance, then the extra amount of the
family allowance can be used to reduce the gross tax liabilities from savings taxable
income.
After subtracting the family allowance, the tax liabilities from the state general
income and state savings income are pooled together. Similarly, the region tax liabilities
(from general and savings income) are also added up. To these two types of tax
liabilities, a set of non-refundable tax credits are applied. Non-refundable tax credits
include part of mortgage payments (if the house was purchased before 2013) and
an extended set of regional and state tax credits.15 Finally, tax liabilities are further
reduced by a set of refundable tax credits. In 2015, such credits were provided for
employed mothers with children below 3 years old, taxpayers with disabled parents
or children, single-parent families with at least two children and large families (those
with 3 or more children, or 2 children when at least one of them is disabled). The
amount of the tax credit given to large families is limited to e2400, while the rest
cannot be larger than e1200.16
14 In 2015, this allowance was e5550 for the taxpayer (e6700 and e6950 for taxpayers older than 65 and
75, respectively), pluse2400 for the first child,e2700 for the second,e4000 for the third, etc; pluse1150
for each dependent parent older than 65 ande1400 for each dependent parent older than 75; pluse3000 for
each disabled member of the household (e9000 euro for severe disabilities). Furthermore, the allowance
for children is increased if they are less than 3 years old. Also note that regions can modify these amounts.
15 The region-specific tax credits, which can be means-tested, include credits for taking care of disabled or
elderly, births, adoptions, large families, school expenses, donations, housing expenses, etc. Other state tax
credits are granted to, among others, charity donations and renters earning income below a certain threshold.
The state tax credit for renters has been phased out since 2015.
16 The most important refundable credit is the one provided to employed mothers with children below 3.
In 2015, close to 750,000 women received it, which represented close to 4% of the total number of tax
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In order to summarize the structure of taxes, let GI j for j = l, k, e be the gross
income from labor (l), capital (k) and self-employment (e). Adjusted gross income
(AGI j ) is obtained by subtracting deductions (D j ) from the gross income. Adjusted
gross income from labor, capital and self-employment is then grouped together under
two categories: general income (g) and savings income (s), i.e.,
G I j − D j = AGI j for j = l, k, e,
and
AGI =
∑
j
AGI j = AGIg + AGIs .
Then another set of deductions (ODg) are subtracted from AGIg to obtain general
taxable income:
TIg = AGIg − ODg.
The family allowance (FA) is calculated as a function of the taxpayer and their family
characteristics. The allowance pertaining to the general income (FAg) is computed as:
FAg =
{
min(T Ig, FA) if T Ig > 0
0, otherwise .
The gross tax liabilities that correspond to TIg are then calculated as:
GTLg = τg(TIg) − τg(FAg),
where τg is the general tax schedule.
In order to obtain the gross tax liabilities for savings income (GTLs), the savings-
adjusted gross income (AGIs) is reduced by unused portions of ODg (denoted by ODs)
to obtain the savings taxable income (T Is = AGIs − ODs).17 The family allowance
pertaining to savings income (FAs) is computed as:
FAs = min(TIs, FA − FAg).
Then, the tax liabilities for savings income are calculated as follows:
GTLs = τs(TIs) − τs(FAs),
where τs is the savings tax schedule.
Finally, the two gross tax liabilities are summed and non-refundable and refundable
tax credits (N T C and T C) are subtracted to obtain tax liabilities:
TL = min(0, GTLg + GTLs − NTC) − TC.
Footnote 16 continued
returns, being granted around e935 on average. The refundable tax credit granted to large families comes
next, which accrued to close to 500,000 taxpayers (2.6% of the total) and amounted to e945 on average.
17 In practice, only certain elements of ODg can be used in ODs .
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2.2 Recent reforms of the personal income tax (2002–2015)
The Spanish PIT has undergone several changes during recent years. In general, the
taxes are reduced and increased in line with the economic expansions and downturns.
The economic expansion of the early 2000s resulted in several tax cuts between 2003
and 2007. Furthermore, right at the start of the economic crisis in 2008, additional
cuts were implemented in order to stimulate a slowing economy. In contrast, after
2008, the sharp fall in the GDP and the subsequent deterioration of the budget balance
led to sizable tax increases between 2010 and 2012. Once again, following the recent
economic recovery, significant tax cuts took place in 2015.
The first major reform of the personal income tax during the twenty-first century
was in 2003. It involved a reduction in the number of tax brackets (from 6 to 5) and
tax rates (the top marginal tax rate was reduced from 48 to 45%). There was also an
increase in the family allowance (e.g., for a taxpayer with 2 children, by about e600),
and a tax credit of e1200 on employed mothers with at least one child below age 3
was introduced. In 2007 the government implemented a big reform, which consisted
of a further reduction of tax brackets (from 5 to 4) and tax rates. (The top marginal
tax rates were reduced from 45 to 43%.) The family allowance was also increased
(e.g., for a taxpayer with 2 children, one of them below age 3, by close to e5000)
and was redefined as a general income tax credit instead of a deduction. Three other
important changes were a raise in savings tax rates (from 15 to 18%), a reshuffling of
tax bases, which moved many capital income items to the savings schedule, and the
introduction of a tax credit of e2500 on births and adoptions. In 2008, a e400 tax
credit for labor and self-employment income earners was introduced in order to spur
private expenditure. Furthermore, a non-refundable tax credit for house renters was
also implemented.
Between 2010 and 2012, the successive governments increased taxes or reduced
deductions and credits in the context of the economic crisis and the deterioration of the
budget balance. In 2010 the e400 tax benefit was eliminated and the savings tax rates
were increased (from 18 to 21% for taxpayers earning more than e6000 of savings
income). In 2011 the tax credit on births and adoptions was eliminated and the top
marginal tax rates were increased from 43 to a range of 44.9% to 49%, depending
on the region. In 2012 the government approved a significant increase of marginal
rates, which affected the entire tax schedule (for instance, the top marginal rates were
increased by 7 percentage points). This tax increase, which was initially intended to
last for two years, was later extended until 2014. Furthermore, a deduction associated
with house purchases was eliminated in 2013.
After the crisis, the government adopted a big reform. It consisted in a reduction of
tax brackets and tax rates, which overturned partly the 2012 tax raise, and resulted in
the tax system outlined in Fig. 2. Also, the family allowance was increased, and a set
of new refundable tax credits that depend on family characteristics were introduced
(such as the one accruing to large families).
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3 Data
3.1 Microdata on tax returns (2002–2015)
We use an administrative dataset containing a (stratified) random sample of tax returns,
which includes almost the complete set of fiscal and socio-demographic information
taxpayers provide in their returns. Hence, the dataset provides a very detailed account
of income from different sources, tax benefits, tax liabilities and household character-
istics (number of dependent relatives, disability, location, etc.). The income and taxes
paid are not censored either at the bottom or at the top of the distribution.
The unit of observation in the dataset is a tax return, which can be of two types:
single or joint. As mentioned, single tax returns are filed at the individual level, whereas
joint tax returns represent two spouses filing together, or single-parent families with
at least one child. In joint tax returns incomes are pooled together and taxpayers are
entitled to an additional tax deduction on top of those accruing to single filings (see
Fig. 1). Other than this additional deduction, the computation of tax liabilities under
both types of filing is almost identical. The filing status is chosen by the taxpayer. In
general, joint tax returns benefit couples in which one partner earns little or no income,
as well as single-parent families with dependent children.18
The dataset has both a cross section and panel component.19 Repeated cross sections
are available from 2002 to 2015, and they have a large sample size. The 2015 cross
section, for example, contains 2.7 million observations, which is around 14% of the
universe of tax returns. For 2007–2010 and 2002–2006 periods, the sample size equals
around 10% and 5% of the population, respectively. In these repeated cross sections,
it is not possible to match household members, e.g., to match a husband and wife who
file two independent single tax returns. As a result, it is not possible to study taxes at
the household level.
The panel dataset covers the period 1999–2013 and has a smaller sample size
(around 3.2% of the universe of taxpayers in 2013). The main advantage of the panel
is that it is possible to match spouses who file single tax returns. Therefore, it is possible
to compute total taxes paid by households. Furthermore, computing incomes and taxes
at the household level allows us to compare the household income distribution from
tax data with that obtained from survey data, such as the EFF. Below we use the cross
section and the panel data to describe and estimate the tax functions for individual
taxpayers and households, respectively.
Table 2 provides a comparison between the cross section sample aggregates in 2015
and their population. The data provide a very accurate representation of income and
tax liabilities of the 19.5 million tax return filers, the differences being less than 1% on
18 In 2015, single tax returns accounted for close to 80% of the total, while the remaining were joint tax
returns.
19 The datasets are named Muestra IRPF IEF-AEAT (Declarantes) and Panel IRPF 1999/2013 IEF-AEAT
(Declarantes). They are administered by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (http://www.ief.es/), a research
institute within the Ministry of Finance and Civil Service. A detailed description (in Spanish) and some
statistics are provided every year in the working paper series of the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (https://
goo.gl/1Nyota). For example, see Pérez López et al. (2018) for a description of the 2015 cross section wave.
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Table 2 Accuracy of the 2015 cross section data (eBillion)
Sample aggregate Population aggregate Difference (%)
(1) (2) (3)
Number of taxpayers (million) 19.5 19.5 0.0
Gross labor income 394.1 393.3 0.2
Gross capital income 46.3 46.6 − 0.8
Gross self-employment income 25.8 26.5 − 2.6
Taxable income 374.7 375.0 − 0.1
Tax liabilities 65.5 65.6 −0.2
The source of the population aggregates is the Spanish tax agency (Estadísticas de los declarantes del
Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas (IRPF), available at https://goo.gl/yAhF63). The definitions
of the variables are described in Sect. 3.2. Gross capital income excludes some small items for which no
population aggregates are reported
the selected items, except for gross income reported by the self-employed, for which
the discrepancy is larger.
3.2 Definitions and sample restrictions
In this section, we explain in detail the definition of the main variables used in the
paper. Specifically, we describe the different income types we account for, the char-
acterization of tax liabilities and tax benefits and the computation of effective average
and marginal tax rates.
We use three income definitions. First, gross income is the sum of labor, capital and
self-employment income. Labor income comprises benefits in cash and in kind granted
to individuals as employees. Capital income includes both financial income (interests,
dividends, capital gains, etc.) and real-estate income. Self-employment income cor-
responds to the earnings of the self-employed associated with their businesses.20 It is
important to note that gross self-employment income and part of gross capital income
are reported in the dataset net of some deductible expenses and tax deductions. Since we
do not observe these deductions, what we call gross income is less than actual pre-tax
income for these categories. This can be particularly important for the self-employed,
as such deductions can be relatively high, which may lead to an underestimation of
their income. For this reason, we also provide a second definition of income, adjusted
gross income, where all income categories are net of deductible expenses. The third
income category is taxable income, which corresponds to income subject to the appli-
cation of the (general and savings) tax schedules. Note that we define also the general
and savings taxable incomes, to which the corresponding general and savings tax
schedules are applied.
Tax benefits can be of two types: tax deductions and tax credits. Tax deductions
are amounts subtracted directly from the tax base, before the application of the tax
schedules. Therefore, total tax deductions are equal to gross income minus taxable
20 It also includes any income of employees (wage and salary earners) who set up an economic activity to
generate income.
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income. Tax credits, on the other hand, are amounts subtracted from the tax liabilities.
Hence, they represent the difference between the amount that is calculated by the
application of the tax schedule to taxable income and the final tax liabilities. Tax
liabilities correspond to the amount that the taxpayer effectively has to pay, i.e., they
are net of all, refundable or non-refundable, tax credits. As a result, they can be
negative.
The average effective tax rates are computed as tax liabilities over gross income.21
We also define the average effective general tax rate as tax liabilities resulting from the
application of the general tax schedule net of the family allowance (the box Gross Tax
Liabilities 1 in Fig. 1) over general income. We subtract the family allowance because
for many (low-income) taxpayers, this is equal to the general taxable income, hence by
subtracting it from the numerator we avoid an artificial overestimation of the general
tax rate. (For these taxpayers, the resulting average general tax rate is zero.) Average
savings tax rates are computed similarly.22 Finally, the statutory marginal tax rates
for a particular income level (or income window) are calculated as the average of the
marginal rates of general and savings income, weighted by the corresponding income
shares. We also calculate effective marginal tax rates as the change in tax liabilities
that result from marginal changes in gross income.23
In all calculations, we restrict the sample to taxpayers with positive total gross
income, nonnegative gross income from different sources (labor, capital and self-
employment) and average tax rates below the maximum statutory marginal tax rate.
We do not restrict the sample by the age of the taxpayer. These restrictions only affect
about 3% of all taxpayers in the sample.24
3.3 Survey of Household Finances
As mentioned above, we compare the estimated household income distribution from
the tax return data with that obtained from the Survey of Household Finances. The EFF
21 If the tax liabilities are non-positive, then we set the tax rate to zero. Note that we could also compute
tax rates as the ratio of tax liabilities to adjusted gross income. We favor the broader definition of income
to compute average tax rates and total tax deductions.
22 According to the 2015 tax code, the boxes (in Modelo 100) corresponding to each definition are the
following. Gross income: 10 (labor) + 33 + 43 + 70 + 71 + 212 + 213 + 214 + 215 + 216 + 235 + 240 +
244 + 250 + 366 + 370 (capital) + 125 + 150 + 180 (self-employment). Adjusted gross income: 22 (labor)
+ 37 + 47 + 70 + 71 + 212 + 213 + 214 + 215 + 216 + 235 + 240 + 244 + 250 + 366 − 376 − 379 − 378 +
370 − 382 − 383 − 384 − 385 − 387 − 388 − 389 − 390 (capital) + 125 + 150 + 180 (self-employment).
Taxable income: 440 (general) + 445 (savings). General income: 10 + 43 + 70 + 71 + 125 + 150 + 180 +
212 + 215 + 216 + 235 + 240 + 244 + 250 + 366. Savings income: 33 + 213 + 214 + 370. Tax liabilities:
532 − 546 − 557 − 572 − 588 − 590. Average effective general tax rate: 476 + 477general income . Average effective
savings tax rate: 484 + 485savings income .
23 Specifically, we follow Guner et al. (2014), Section 6. For each income level y0, represented as a ratio
of income over mean income, the marginal tax rate is approximated as the average of the variation in tax
liabilities when income increases to y0 + y and when income decreases to y0 − y, with y = 0.4.
Below we compute effective marginal rates from income levels ranging 0.2 to 9.8 in steps of 0.4.
24 Table A.1 in the online appendix shows that the average income and other characteristics of the restricted
sample do not differ significantly from those of the universe of taxpayers.
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is a survey conducted by the Bank of Spain that collects information on socioeconomic
characteristics, income, assets, debts and spending of around 6000 households in each
wave. Moreover, the survey oversamples high-wealth households, in order to allow
for a sufficient number of observations to study the financial behavior at the top of the
wealth distribution and to accurately measure aggregate wealth. The EFF is undertaken
every three years, the first wave was in 2002 and the last one in 2014. Each wave
accounts for annual income pertaining to the previous year. A detailed description of
the survey can be found in Bover et al. (2018).
Note that households in the tax data are defined as the taxpayer and their spouse,
i.e., excluding other members of the household filing a tax return. Therefore, in order
to compare the income aggregates between the tax and the survey data, we construct
two household definitions in the EFF. The first is denoted “fiscal household” and adds
up the gross income of the household’s reference person and their spouse. Note that the
EFF provides information for each household member on labor and self-employment
income items. The capital income items are, however, reported for the whole house-
hold. We assume that all capital income belongs to the household’s reference person
(even if a particular asset could belong, e.g., to an elderly living with the reference
person).25 Note also that we classify the income sources provided by the EFF so as to
mimic the labor, capital and self-employment groups defined in the tax data.26 Second,
we construct a larger household definition encompassing all the household members,
which we denote by the term “whole household.”
As with the tax data, we restrict the sample to households earning positive gross
income and nonnegative gross income from all sources (labor, capital and self-
employment).27 This amounts to dropping around 2% of the households.
4 Basic facts of the income and tax distributions
In this section, we report basic facts on income, tax liabilities and tax benefits for
samples of individuals in 2015 and households in 2013. Moreover, we compare the
results for the households with those obtained from the EFF.
25 Note that since we focus on aggregate household income, it is irrelevant for two-person households to
assign capital income to the reference person, their partner, or to split it between the two.
26 According to the 2014 EFF wave, we define gross income as:
∑
i (p6_64_i + p6_66_i + p6_68_i p6_70
+ p6_74b_i + p6_74_i) + p6_75d1 + p6_75d3 + p6_75d4 (labor) + ∑i p6_72_i (self-employment) + p7_2
+ p7_10 + p7_12 + p7_12a + p7_14 + p7_4a + p7_4b + p7_6a + p7_6b + p7_8a + p7_8b + p6_76b + p6_75f
(capital), where i indexes each household member (the reference person and their spouse in two-person
households and the former in one-person households).
27 Notice that under the two household definitions we impose this rule on the added income of the reference
person and their spouse. Additionally, for the case of “whole households” we apply the restriction on each
household member. Hence, if he/she does not fulfill the restriction, it is excluded from the household.
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4.1 Income distribution
4.1.1 Individuals
Table 3 summarizes how different notions of income are distributed among individuals
in 2015. The inequality in gross incomes is significant. The top quintile accounts for
about 47.1% of total gross income, while the bottom quintile’s share is only 4.6%,
a ratio of 10 to 1. The income share of the top 1%, a popular measure of income
inequality, is about 9.5%. This is lower than other big euro area countries, such as
Germany (11.1%) and France (10.8%), and it is much smaller than what we observe
in Anglo-Saxon economies (12.8% in the UK and 20.2% in the USA). Nevertheless,
it is higher than the top 1% income share in Scandinavian countries (for example,
Sweden is 8.8% and Norway is 8.5%) and in Italy (7.3%).28
When we move to adjusted and taxable incomes in Table 3, the share of higher
quintiles increases. For example, the share of income accounted for the top 20%
increases from 47.1% of gross income, to 51.0% of adjusted gross income and 51.4% of
taxable income. Likewise, both the income share of the top 1% and the Gini coefficient
increase as we move from gross to taxable income. This is not surprising, since most
of the taxes are paid by richer households. Indeed, for many taxpayers at the bottom
quintile (about 20% of them), taxable income becomes zero once deductions are
applied to their gross income.
Finally, columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 show the distribution of income from different
income sources. The capital and self-employment income are much more unequally
distributed than the labor income. The capital income renders a higher degree of
concentration at the bottom and top quintiles, when compared to gross income. For
example, the bottom 20% accounts for just 4.6% of gross income, while it accumulates
5.4% of capital income; the top 1% accumulating 9.5% and 32.7%, respectively. Self-
employment income is also concentrated at the very top, but the lower end of the
income distribution accumulates a substantial amount as well.
Table 4 presents another look at the income distribution in the data. For gross
income, it reports the income cutoffs for different percentiles of the distribution (col-
umn 1). It also reports average gross incomes and average incomes from different
sources at different points of the income distribution (columns 2 to 5). It is worth
noticing that there are only a small number of taxpayers that report relatively large
incomes in their tax returns, which would put them in higher-income brackets (see
Fig. 2). Average individual gross income in the data is about e24,000. Hence, 80%
of households report gross incomes that are below the mean gross income. Indeed,
99% of taxpayers report total gross income below e105,000 (about 5 times the mean
income). Also, columns (2) to (5) show that average income levels across income
sources are low. For instance, the top 1% earns on average slightly abovee120,000 of
28 The numbers are from the World Inequality Database (https://wid.world/) for the year 2015, except for
France and the USA, whose data pertain to 2014. For an analysis of top incomes in Spain, see Alvaredo
and Saez (2014). Martínez-Toledano (2017) provides estimates on the concentration of wealth in Spain.
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Table 4 Individual gross income cutoffs and average income levels (e, 2015)
Quantiles Cutoffs Average income
Gross income Gross income Labor income Capital income Self-employment
income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 0 107 17 84 7
1–5% 310 1809 971 546 292
5–10% 3401 4825 3522 662 642
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 0 5543 4312 651 579
2nd (20–40%) 9508 12,388 10,483 937 968
3rd (40–60%) 15,383 18,806 16,553 1202 1052
4th (60–80%) 22,673 27,581 24,983 1560 1038
5th (80–100%) 33,735 57,143 45,907 7698 3538
Top
90–95% 43,410 48,960 42,900 3929 2131
95–99% 56,971 72,402 59,065 8319 5018
1% 105,473 229,741 122,572 78,899 28,270
This table displays the gross income cutoffs as well as the average of gross income sources across the gross
income distribution according to the 2015 sample of taxpayers
labor income, while average self-employment income of the top 95–99% of taxpayers
is just e5000.29,30
In Table 5 we decompose the sources of income across the income distribution.
As columns (1) to (3) show, labor income is by far the largest source of income. Its
importance increases monotonically from quintiles 1 to 4, where it represents between
80% and 90% of total income. In the top decile income from labor is less important;
although even for the top 1% the share of labor income is very high, close to 65%. In
the lowest end of the distribution, especially in the bottom 1%, capital income appears
very significant, although this reflects the very low-income levels of this group (see
Table 4). Excluding the lowest quintile, capital income accounts for around 6% to 9%
of gross income, reaching 24.1% for the richest taxpayers. Self-employment income
accounts for 7.8% of gross income in the second quintile, while it drops to around
4% to 6% for richer individuals. At the top of the distribution it accounts for slightly
more than 12% of total income. In columns (4) and (5), we show the decomposition
of gross income between general and savings income. While general income is by far
the largest income source, for taxpayers in the top 1% income taxed under the savings
scale is significant, reaching on aggregate 30% of total income.
29 Note that self-employment income is net of deductible expenses associated with the business activity,
see Sect. 3.2. As a result, the figures might underestimate the actual pre-tax income from self-employment.
30 As we document in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the online Appendix A, Tables 3 and 4 change very slightly if
we restrict the sample to ages 16–64, and, as a result, eliminate retired taxpayers who might potentially have
low incomes. The threshold for the top 1% of labor income earners, for example, increases to e132,948.
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Table 5 Individual gross income sources (2015)
Quantiles Labor, capital and self-employment General and savings
Labor income
(%)
Capital
income (%)
Self-employment
income (%)
General
income (%)
Savings
income (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 10.2 85.6 4.3 43.1 57.0
1–5% 47.7 37.3 15.0 85.5 14.5
5–10% 72.3 14.1 13.6 94.7 5.3
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 68.6 20.1 11.3 95.1 4.9
2nd (20–40%) 84.6 7.7 7.8 97.0 3.0
3rd (40–60%) 88.0 6.4 5.6 97.4 2.6
4th (60–80%) 90.6 5.7 3.8 97.4 2.6
5th (80–100%) 87.1 8.4 4.6 90.2 9.8
Top
90–95% 87.7 8.0 4.3 95.5 4.5
95–99% 82.1 11.2 6.7 92.9 7.1
1% 63.2 24.1 12.7 69.9 30.1
This table shows the decomposition of gross income over income sources across the gross income distri-
bution. Columns (1) to (3) depict the decomposition between labor, capital and self-employment income,
whereas columns (4) and (5) show the decomposition of gross income between general and savings income.
Note that columns (1) to (3) and columns (4) to (5) add up to 100
4.1.2 Households
In Table 6 we compare the household income distribution in 2013 computed from the
tax data and from the EFF. Regarding the latter, the column (2) depicts the income
distribution under the fiscal household definition (the household head and their spouse),
whereas the column (4) shows the distribution under the whole household definition
(all the household members). We find that the EFF and the tax data provide very similar
estimates of the income distribution, especially if one focuses on the fiscal household
definition of the EFF. For example, income of the top 20% amounts to around 50% in
both the tax and the survey data, while the bottom 20% receives around 5% of earnings.
In general, the discrepancies between the tax and the survey data tend to be larger at
the top of the income distribution. For example, the EFF seems to underpredict the
share of income accruing to the top 1% by 1.7 percentage points. If one focuses on the
income accruing to all household members (whole household definition), depicted in
column (4), the differences between the tax and the survey data tend to be larger.
4.2 Tax rates and tax liabilities
In Table 7 we summarize the distribution of tax liabilities and tax rates. In columns (1)
and (2), we also depict the corresponding distributions of gross income and taxable
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Table 6 Household income distribution: tax data compared to EFF (2013)
Quantiles Tax data EFF fiscal household EFF whole household
(1) (2) (3)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
1–5% 0.3% 0.7% 0.7%
5–10% 1.0% 1.2% 1.2%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.4% 4.9% 5.1%
2nd (20–40%) 9.6% 9.4% 9.7%
3rd (40–60%) 14.5% 14.5% 15.4%
4th (60–80%) 21.7% 22.7% 22.6%
5th (80–100%) 49.9% 48.5% 47.3%
Top
90–95% 11.0% 11.0% 10.8%
95–99% 13.2% 13.0% 12.5%
1% 9.7% 8.0% 7.6%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.45 0.44 0.42
Var-log income 1.10 0.70 0.66
P90/P10 7.89 7.48 7.01
P50/P10 3.00 2.73 2.73
P90/P50 2.63 2.74 2.56
This table depicts the 2013 household income distribution according to the tax return data (aggregated at
the household level) and the Survey of Household Finances (EFF). Households in the latter are defined in
two ways: first, fiscal household, comprising the household head and their partner; and second, the whole
household, including all the household members
income (already shown in Table 3), in order to illustrate the progressivity of the tax
code. While the top quintile accounts for 47.1% of gross income, it pays around 73%
of total tax liabilities. Similarly, the top 1% accounts for 9.5% of gross income, but
pays about 21% of total taxes. As a matter of fact, close to 93% of tax payments are
concentrated in the top 40%, while the bottom two deciles account for only 0.5% of
the tax.
The high concentration of tax liabilities is reflected in the small average tax rates at
the lower end of the income distribution and the larger rates at the upper end, which
average 19.0% in the top quintile and 30.6% in the top 1%. Average statutory marginal
tax rates are also highest for richer individuals, reaching almost 40% for the top 1%,
while they are significantly lower as we move down the income distribution.
These averages hide a substantial degree of heterogeneity across individuals. Panel
A of Fig. 3 depicts the average effective tax rates across different multiples of mean
gross income, together with 2 standard error bands.31 As can be seen, there is wide
31 Note that mean individual gross income in 2015 was e24,291, while household mean income in 2013
amounted to e30,839.
123
SERIEs (2019) 10:439–477 457
Table 7 Distribution of individual tax liabilities and tax rates (2015)
Quantiles Gross
income (%)
Taxable
income (%)
Tax
liabilities (%)
Average tax
rate (%)
Statutory marginal
tax rate (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0
1–5% 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.9
5–10% 1.0 0.3 −0.1 0.0 8.1
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.6 2.0 −0.2 0.1 12.9
2nd (20–40%) 10.2 7.9 0.7 1.3 20.3
3rd (40–60%) 15.5 15.3 7.0 6.4 23.4
4th (60–80%) 22.7 23.4 19.4 11.8 27.8
5th (80–100%) 47.1 51.4 73.2 19.0 34.5
Top
90–95% 10.1 10.8 13.8 19.0 35.5
95–99% 11.9 13.1 20.6 23.8 39.5
1% 9.5 11.1 21.0 30.6 39.9
This table shows the distribution of individual tax liabilities (column 3), average effective tax rates (column
4) and statutory marginal tax rates (column 5) across the gross income distribution. In columns (1) and (2),
the distribution of gross income and taxable income is summarized in order to highlight the progressivity
of the tax code
Panel A: Effective Average Tax Rates
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Notes: Panel A depicts the 2015 effective average tax rate (± 2 standard deviations) across different multiples of mean income. Each
data point corresponds to the mean average tax rate of taxpayers whose income is larger than or equal to the point in the x-axis and
less than the next point. For instance, the data point of mean income 1.4 is the mean average tax rate of taxpayers earning income
within the interval [1.4,1.8). For the last point (9.8), the tax rate is calculated for incomes between 9.8 and 10.2 of mean income. Panel
B shows the statutory and effective marginal tax rates. Statutory rates are computed as the weighted average of general and savings
marginal rates (gross of the family tax credit), while effective rates are computed as explained in footnote 23.
Fig. 3 Individual effective average and marginal tax rates (2015)
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Panel A: Share of Positive Effective Tax Rates
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Panel B: Effective Tax Rates and Share of Tax Returns
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Notes: The panel A plots the share of taxpayers facing effective positive tax rates in each income bin. The panel B depicts the 2015
mean effective average tax rates and the share of taxpayers across bins of mean income.
Fig. 4 Effective tax rates along the income distribution (individuals 2015)
variation of tax rates even for individuals with the same gross income, being this the
result of different family characteristics and tax benefit entitlements. The shape of this
curve is what the parametric estimates of Sect. 5 are meant to approximate.32
In panel B of Fig. 3, we represent the corresponding curves of statutory and effective
marginal tax rates. The figure shows that marginal rates increase rapidly with income,
but stabilize at around 3 times mean income (e75,000) and start to decline linearly at
a slow rate. The set of tax benefits renders the effective curve below the statutory one,
being the difference roughly about 4 percentage points on average.
Figure 4 highlights two key features of the distribution of tax liabilities and taxes
in Spain. First, a significant share of individuals face a zero effective tax rate, around
37% of all taxpayers in 2015. The panel A shows that until about 45% of mean income
(e11,000), the percentage of taxpayers facing positive rates is only about 10%. The
share increases steeply afterward, and by 90% of mean income (e22,000) more than
90% of taxpayers pay taxes, with the share of positive tax liabilities converging to 100%
as income increases. As we detail below, this feature of the tax will be important
in the parametric estimates of effective tax functions. Second, most taxpayers are
concentrated on relatively low-income levels. The panel B of Fig. 4 shows the share
of tax returns in each income bin and the effective tax curve already plotted in panel A
of Fig. 3. While the effective tax rates increase from 0 to about 30%, most taxpayers
face much lower rates. For about 75% of all taxpayers, the effective tax rates are below
15% (the sum of the first 3 bars in Fig. 4). As a result, while most discussion on tax
increases and tax cuts focus on top marginal rates, for a great majority of households,
the relevant tax rates are much lower.33
32 Figure A.1 in the online appendix shows that median tax levels are almost identical to mean tax levels
up to 4 times mean income (about e100,000) and slightly higher above that.
33 See Guner et al. (2018) for a quantitative analysis of how higher tax rates on top incomes affect the total
tax collection in Spain.
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4.3 Tax benefits (deductions and credits)
We next turn to the distribution of tax benefits. In Table 8 we describe the distribution
of the most important tax deductions, which, as we mentioned in Sect. 3.2, are tax
benefits that reduce directly the tax base. Table A.4 in the online appendix documents
the importance of different deductions for taxpayers at different points in the income
distribution as well as for all taxpayers (the last row). When we consider the aggre-
gate, the most important tax deduction is the one granted to labor income earners,
which accounts for about 63% of total deductions. It is followed by social security
contributions paid by the employees (20%), the tax benefit associated with joint tax
returns (10%) and the contributions to private pension plans (4%). There are, however,
differences in the importance of these deductions along the income distribution. For
instance, the deduction for contributions to private pension plans accounts for 27% of
all tax deductions for the top 1% of taxpayers, while it represents less than 2% for the
first two quintiles.34
The top quintile benefits from more than 25% of the total tax deductions, while the
bottom quintile receives around 16% (see the first column of Table 8). This reflects the
fact that two important deductions, those associated with private pension plans and
social security contributions, benefit mostly the top two quintiles. The top quintile, for
example, got 71.5% of benefits associated with private pensions and 41% of benefits
associated with social security contributions. Furthermore, the tax base of many low-
income earners goes to zero after making use of some tax benefits, hence exhausting
the possibility of further deductions.
Tax credits, as mentioned in Sect. 3.2, correspond to tax benefits that are subtracted
directly from the tax liabilities. Table 9 depicts their distribution across income groups,
and Table A.5 in the online appendix shows their relative importance for different
income groups. By far the family allowance is the largest tax credit, representing
more than 95% of these benefits for the bottom 20% and more than 80% for the top
20%. Next is the tax credit associated with house purchases, that granted to employed
mothers, large families and a battery of region-specific tax credits.35
As for the distribution of these benefits, the family allowance is evenly distributed,
since it depends solely on family characteristics. Note that the smaller share accruing
to the lower end of the income distribution is explained by the exhaustion of tax
liabilities as a result of the application of (part of) this allowance. On the contrary,
the tax credits associated with house purchases and large families benefit the richer
individuals, whereas benefits granted to employed mothers and the set of region-
specific benefits go mainly to the middle of the income distribution.
34 Ayuso et al. (2019) estimate the savings effect of the introduction of this deduction in 1988. They show
that when this policy was introduced, most contributions to pension funds were made by older and high-
income individuals, who had the largest marginal potential gains. Since 1988 the policy becomes very
popular. In 2015, close to 15% of taxpayers had some contribution to pension plans.
35 The tax credit associated with house purchases was stopped in 2013, so that it only benefits transactions
carried out before that year.
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5 Parametric estimates
In this section, we present the estimated effective average tax functions. We proceed
as follows. First, we show the estimates of the average and marginal tax rate functions
for individuals in 2015. Second, we present an alternative approach and estimate
separate parametric functions for the different components of income (general income
and savings income), as well as for tax credits, which we refer to as the three-function
approach. Most of our analysis focuses on single tax functions that map gross incomes
to tax liabilities. Besides its simplicity, this approach provides estimates that can be
compared with available estimates for other countries. Furthermore, division of general
and savings income in Spanish tax code does not easily lend itself to notions of capital
and labor income in macro models, since some forms of capital income, e.g., rents
from real estates, are lumped together with more standard forms of labor income.
Third, we present an evaluation of all the estimated functions by their capacity
to predict the amount and the distribution of tax liabilities. Fourth, we account for
changes in taxes over time by providing estimates of the tax functions for individuals
between 2002 and 2015. Finally, we estimate functions for households in 2013.
5.1 Effective tax functions of individuals in 2015
In order to account for the fact that a significant number of Spanish taxpayers face a
zero tax rate (panel A of Fig. 4), we estimate:
t( I˜ ) =
{
0 if I˜ < I¯ ,
f ( I˜ ) if I˜ ≥ I¯ , (1)
where t is the average tax rate, I˜ stands for multiples of mean gross income, I¯ is
the income threshold, chosen so as to minimize the mean-squared error and f ( I˜ ) is
a parsimonious nonlinear function. Following Guner et al. (2014), we consider two
possible specifications of f : The HSV specification, used by Benabou (2002) and
Heathcote et al. (2017):36
f ( I˜ ) = 1 − λ( I˜ )−τ , (2)
and the GS specification, used in Gouveia and Strauss (1994):
f (I ) = b[1 − (s I p + 1)− 1p ]. (3)
Note that in this case I˜ is replaced by I , i.e., by the income level.37
36 In the HSV specification, λ determines the average taxes while τ determines the progressivity. When
τ = 0, taxes are flat and equal to 1 − λ. When τ > 0, taxes are positive, and higher levels of τ imply a
greater degree of progressivity.
37 Guner et al. (2014) consider also two other specifications: a log specification ( f ( I˜ ) = α + βlog( I˜ ))
and a power specification ( f ( I˜ ) = δ + γ I˜ 	 ). These functions perform worse for the Spanish data than the
HSV and GS specifications. The estimates are available upon request.
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Table 10 Parametric estimates
of the average tax functions Functions Individuals 2015 Households 2013(1) (2)
HSV
λ 0.8985 0.8823
(0.0000) (0.0001)
τ 0.1483 0.1224
(0.0001) (0.0001)
I¯ 49% 36%
MSE 0.0011271 0.0018442
GS
b 0.3356 0.3283
(0.0003) (0.0007)
s 0.0003 0.0019
(0.0000) (0.0000)
p 2.7340 1.8810
(0.0072) (0.0085)
I¯ 55% 42%
MSE 0.0011258 0.0018817
This table shows the parameter estimates of the effective average tax
functions for individuals in 2015 and for households in 2013. I¯ is
the percentage of mean income below which the effective taxes are
estimated to be zero. Each column accounts for a different sample:
individuals in 2015 and households in 2013. MSE stands for mean-
squared error. Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 10 shows the parameter estimates.38 In general, the parameters are estimated
with a high degree of precision. The income cutoffs are estimated between 49% and
55% of mean income for individuals in 2015 and between 36% and 42% of mean
income for households in 2013.
In panel A of Fig. 5, we plot the estimated average tax rates resulting from the
specifications together with the data. The observed average tax rates show a steep
increase at lower income levels and then flatten out at the right-end of the income
distribution. Using the OECD tax and benefit calculator, Holter et al. (2018) estimate
HSV effective tax functions for a group of OECD countries. Their estimate of τ for
Spain is 0.148 (close to our estimate in Table 10). Their results imply higher levels
of τ , i.e., higher degrees of progressivity, for most European countries, e.g., 0.18 for
Italy, 0.2 for the UK, 0.22 for Germany and Sweden and 0.26 for Denmark.39
From equation (2), the marginal tax rate of the HSV specification is given by:
m( I˜ ) = 1 − λ(1 − τ) I˜ −τ , (4)
38 These functions are estimated by NLS. Following Guner et al. (2014), we divide I by 1,000 when
estimating the GS function. Figure A.2 in the online appendix shows the mean-squared error of the HSV
and GS specifications, as a function of I¯ .
39 For the OECD tax and benefit calculator, see: http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benets-and-wages/tax-
benet-webcalculator/.
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Panel A: Average Tax Rates
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
0.
35
0.
40
0.
45
0.
50
A
ve
ra
ge
 T
ax
 R
at
es
0.6 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.4 5.8 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.6 9.0 9.4 9.8
Multiples of Mean Income
Data HSV GS
Panel B: Marginal Tax Rates
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Notes: This figure plots the mean effective tax rates by income level as well as the predicted rates resulting from the estimated tax
functions (HSV and GS specifications). The panel A shows the effective average tax rates, whereas the panel B depicts the implied
marginal rate functions. Each data point corresponds to the mean tax rate of taxpayers whose income is larger than or equal to the
point in the x-axis and less than the next point. For the last point (9.8), the tax rate is calculated for incomes between 9.8 and 10.2 of
mean income. The tax rate functions are evaluated at the corresponding point in the x-axis. The parametric estimates of the average
tax rate functions can be found in the first column of Table 10. See section 4.2 for details on the computation of effective marginal
rates.
Fig. 5 Effective tax functions (individuals 2015)
while from equation (3) we can derive the marginal tax rate function of the GS speci-
fication as:
m(I ) = b[1 − (s I p + 1)−1/p−1]. (5)
Using the parametric estimates depicted in Table 10, the panel B of Fig. 5 shows
the resulting marginal tax rate functions, as well as the data. The data for marginal tax
rates correspond to effective marginal tax rates. As mentioned in Sect. 4.2, effective
marginal rates increase rapidly and flatten out at a certain income level. This last
feature is well accounted for by the shape of the GS function. On the other hand,
marginal tax rates under this specification increase and flatten too quickly compared
to the data. At around 5 times mean income, the marginal tax rates are 33.5% under
the GS specification, while they are 36.8% in the data. In contrast, for 1.5 times
mean income, the GS tax function overestimates the marginal tax rates by around 3.5
percentage points. On the contrary, the HSV tax function captures the marginal tax
rates very well up to 4 times mean income. After 4 times mean income, however,
the marginal tax rates keep increasing under the HSV function, while they are flat in
the data. By 5 times mean income, for example, the marginal tax rate under the HSV
function is about 3 percentage points higher than the data.
Overall, the HSV function fits well the tax rates of the well-off, but it is unable to
capture the near constant marginal tax rates at very high-income levels, which leads
to an overestimation of taxes paid by the very rich. On the contrary, the GS function
tends to under estimate the average tax rates, yet it captures very well the flattening
out of tax rates.40,41
40 Regarding the tax functions of individuals by marital status, we found no remarkable differences between
taxes paid by single and married individuals, see Figure A.3 in the online appendix.
41 As we show in the online Appendices A and B, when we restrict the sample to taxpayers between ages
16-64, we get very similar results, see Table A.6 and Figure A.4.
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5.2 Three-function approach
In this section, we provide an alternative approach to parameterize the Spanish Personal
Income Tax. We estimate three different functions that connect income from different
sources (general vs. savings) to the tax liabilities. Specifically, we estimate a function
that relates general income with general tax rates; a second function that links the
savings income to the savings tax rates; and a third function that accounts for the
amount of tax credits as a function of total gross income. In this way, starting from
gross income by income source, the final tax liabilities of the taxpayer can be easily
estimated by going through each of these functions. It must be noted that one advantage
of this three-function approach is that it allows simulating more detailed reforms, such
as a change in capital tax rates.
For the general tax rate function, we pose the same functional form as in the effective
tax function estimated in Sect. 5.1, i.e., that described in equation (1). We follow this
approach given that the shape of general tax rates resembles that of effective tax
rates. We estimate this function under the two specifications HSV(equation 2) and
GS (equation 3). Note that in this case t stands for the average general tax rate, I˜ for
multiples of mean general income and I for the general income level.42
Regarding the savings tax rates (panel B of Fig. 2), we estimate the following linear
function with a kink:
ts( I˜s) =
{
α + ζ I˜s if I˜s < S¯,
κ if I˜s ≥ S¯, (6)
where ts is the average savings tax rate, I˜s stands for multiples of mean savings income,
κ is the sample mean of the savings tax rate if I˜s ≥ S¯, and S¯ is again chosen so as to
minimize the MSE.
Finally, for the tax credit function, we follow Guner et al. (2017) and estimate the
following Ricker model:
c( I˜ ) = β0 + exp(β1)exp(β2 I˜ ) I˜ β3 , (7)
where c stands for total tax credits as a fraction of gross income and I˜ refers to multiples
of mean gross income.43,44
The three estimated functions are depicted in Fig. 6, while the parametric estimates
are shown in Table 11. The panel A of the figure indicates that both the HSV and
the GS specifications capture well the shape of the general income tax function. In
panel B, also, it becomes apparent that the shape of the savings income tax function is
well approximated by a piecewise functions of the form estimated, where the tax rate
increases linearly and flattens out at around 13 times mean savings income. Finally,
tax credits seem to benefit more, as a fraction of gross income, taxpayers earning
42 Mean general income in 2015 was e22,805, whereas mean savings income was e1486.
43 Note that total tax credits are computed net of the family allowance, since the latter is subsumed in the
computation of the general tax rate, see the definition thereof in Sect. 3.2. Also, note that the general tax rate
function and the tax credit function are estimated by NLS, while the savings tax rate function is estimated
by OLS. In the estimation of the tax credit functions, we exclude a few observations whose tax credits are
larger than their gross income.
44 The second term in equation (7) is known as Ricker function, after Ricker (1954).
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Panel A: General Tax Rates
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Panel B: Savings Tax Rates
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Panel C: Tax Credits
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Notes: This figure plots the estimation of the three parametric tax functions of the Spanish Personal Income Tax, namely, the average
general tax rate (panel A), the average savings tax rate (panel B) and tax credits as a fraction of gross income, see Section 5.2. Each
data point corresponds to the mean average tax rate (panels A and C) or tax credit (panel B) of taxpayers whose income is larger than
or equal to the point in the x-axis and less than the next point. For the last point, i.e. 9.8 (panels A and C) and 20 (panel B), the data
are calculated for incomes between 9.8 and 10.2 and between 20 and 21 of mean income, respectively.
Fig. 6 Parametric functions: three-function approach (individuals 2015)
around mean income. From that point on, the incidence of tax credits diminishes until
it converges at around 0.62% of gross income. This shape is decently captured by
the model proposed, yet the tax credits of the right-end of the income distribution are
overstated, see the panel C.
5.3 Evaluation of tax functions
How well do these functions capture the level and the distribution of tax liabilities? In
this section, we provide an assessment. In the first column of Table 12, we depict the
distribution of tax revenue by income quantile in the data. The remaining columns show
the percentage deviation of the estimates from the data. We can see that the tax functions
approximate quite well total tax collection, except the HSV specification of the single-
function approach, which tend to overpredict it. For example, both specifications in the
three-function approach render a deviation of less than 1.5%, while the GS function in
the one-function approach underestimates total revenue by less than 1%. As already
observed in Fig. 5, the fact that this function converged to a top marginal tax rate
below the one observed in the data leads to an underprediction of taxes paid by the top
1%, although the revenue raised by the top 20% is well accounted for. In contrast, the
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Table 11 Parametric estimates of the tax functions: three-function approach (individuals 2015)
Parameters Individuals 2015 Parameters Individuals 2015
(1) (2)
General income tax rates (HSV) Savings income tax rates
λ 0.8919 α 0.1272
(0.0000) (0.0001)
τ 0.1581 ζ 0.0057
(0.0001) (0.0001)
I¯ 49% κ 0.2018
MSE 0.0008902 (0.0374)
S¯ 13.14
MSE 0.0076674
General income tax rates (GS) Tax credits
b 0.3893 β0 0.0085
(0.0004) (0.0000)
s 0.0015 β1 12.5683
(0.0000) (0.2572)
p 2.0366 β2 −17.5032
(0.0041) (0.2610)
I¯ 58% β3 14.4012
(0.2142)
MSE 0.0009215 MSE 0.0008593
This table shows the parameter estimates of the general income tax function (for both the HSV and GS
specifications), the savings income tax function and the tax credits function for individuals. I¯ stands for
mean general income below which tax rates are estimated to be zero, while S¯ is the estimated kink of the
savings tax function
ever-increasing top marginal tax rate of the HSV function results in an overprediction
of taxes paid by the 20% and 1% richest taxpayers in the one-function approach.
Table 13 provides a comparison in terms of the percentage point difference of the
distribution of tax liabilities along the income distribution. As noted earlier, most
tax revenue is accounted for by the top 40% (see the first column), a degree of pro-
gressiveness that is well captured by the tax functions. Also, as noted before, the
main challenge is to account for the average rates of the very rich. In this regard,
it is worth noting that the differences are reasonably small, being lower than 1.5
percentage points in all specifications, except the HSV function in the one-function
approach.
5.4 Changes in effective tax rates since 2000
In panel A of Fig. 7, we plot the average tax rates (normalized with respect to average
income) from the repeated cross sections of the data for a selection of years. We can
see that the narrative account of the most significant policy actions adopted during
123
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Table 12 Evaluation of tax functions: total tax liabilities in 2015 (% Difference with respect to the data)
Quantiles Data (ebn) One-function approach Three-function approach
HSV (%) GS (%) HSV (%) GS (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 0.0 – – – –
1–5% 0.0 – – – –
5–10% 0.0 – – – –
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) − 0.1 – – – –
2nd (20–40%) 0.4 50.4 54.1 14.8 7.7
3rd (40–60%) 4.5 7.3 2.6 − 2.3 − 2.7
4th (60–80%) 12.4 − 0.3 − 2.1 − 0.6 − 4.0
5th (80–100%) 46.9 7.1 0.6 0.8 −1.0
Top
90–95% 8.8 − 0.4 3.6 1.4 3.8
95–99% 13.2 − 2.0 − 0.5 − 1.8 0.8
1% 13.4 27.7 − 1.5 2.1 − 8.2
Total
Tax liabilities 64.0 6.2 0.8 0.5 − 1.5
This table shows the % difference across income groups of total tax liabilities estimated from each tax
function and the data. Columns (2) and (3) are based on tax functions estimated from final tax liabilities,
i.e., the one-function approach, see Sect. 5.1. Column (2) displays the results of the HSV function, while
column (3) is based on the GS function. In columns (4) and (5), we report the results from the three-function
approach. This entails estimating one function each for general income tax rates, savings income tax rates
and tax credits. In column (4) the general income function is the HSV specification, whereas in column (5)
it is the GS function. The savings income tax rates are modeled by a linear function with a kink and tax
credits are estimated as in Guner et al. (2017). See Sect. 5.2 for more details
2002 to 2015 (see Sect. 2.2) helps to interpret the changes in the tax curves. First,
the 2003 tax cut implied a significant drop in average tax rates with respect to 2002.
Second, the tax cuts during the expansion led to further downward movements of the
tax curve, see the 2007 function. Third, the 2010-2011 tax increase placed average tax
rates above the levels observed in 2003, while the sharp increase in marginal taxes in
2012–014 moved the curve upward across the whole income distribution, rendering
the highest rates during this period. And finally, the 2015 tax cut reversed partially
the tax increases implemented during the crisis.45 Appendix Figure A.5 displays the
estimation of the GS (panel A) and HSV functions (panel B) for each year, while Table
A.7 reports the parameter estimates.
45 The picture encompassing the full set of years as well as the parameter estimates is available upon
request.
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Table 13 Evaluation of tax functions: distribution of tax liabilities in 2015 (percentage points difference
with respect to the data)
Quantiles Data One-function approach Three-function approach
HSV GS HSV GS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1–5% 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5–10% − 0.1% 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) − 0.2% 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
2nd (20–40%) 0.7% 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1
3rd (40–60%) 7.0% 0.1 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.1
4th (60–80%) 19.4% − 1.2 − 0.5 − 0.2 − 0.5
5th (80–100%) 73.2% 0.6 − 0.1 0.2 0.4
Top
90–95% 13.8% − 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.7
95–99% 20.6% − 1.6 − 0.3 − 0.5 0.5
1% 21.0% 4.3 − 0.5 0.3 − 1.4
This table shows the percentage point difference of the distribution of tax liabilities across income groups
estimated from each tax function and the data. Columns (2) and (3) are based on tax functions estimated
from final tax liabilities, i.e., the one-function approach, see Sect. 5.1. Column (2) displays the results of the
HSV function, while column (3) is based on the GS function. In columns (4) and (5), we report the results
from the three-function approach. This entails estimating one function each for general income tax rates,
savings income tax rates and tax credits. In column (4) the general income function is the HSV specification,
whereas in column (5) it is the GS function. The savings income tax rates are modeled by a linear function
with a kink and tax credits are estimated as in Guner et al. (2017). See Sect. 5.2 for more details
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Fig. 7 Overtime evolution of average tax rates (2002–2015)
5.5 Effective tax functions for households in 2013
The second column of Table 10 provides the parameter estimates of the tax function
faced by households in 2013, while Fig. 8 gives a graphical representation. The panel A
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Panel A: All households: Data and functions
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Panel B: Single Households
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Panel C: Married Households
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
0.
35
0.
40
0.
45
0.
50
A
ve
ra
ge
 T
ax
 R
at
es
0.6 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.4 5.8 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.6 9.0 9.4 9.8
Multiples of Mean Income
Data HSV GS
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Fig. 8 Effective average tax rates: data and functions (households 2013)
of the figure shows that both the HSV and GS functions track very accurately the shape
of average taxes along the income distribution. Furthermore, in regard to differences
by marital status, the panel B shows that the HSV specification tends to overestimate
the marginal tax rates of the richest single households, which comprise around 45% of
all households, while both functions are able to capture well the tax curve of married
households (see panel C).46
6 After-tax income
In this section, we provide a brief account of after-tax income in both the tax and the
survey (the EFF) data. This allows us to evaluate the progressiveness of the tax code,
by comparing gross income and after-tax income figures. Note that in the survey data
after-tax income is not observed. For this reason, we use the tax functions to estimate,
given gross income, the tax liabilities faced by the household, as we explain below.
After-tax income, in both the administrative and survey data, is computed as gross
income minus tax liabilities.
46 Table A.8 in the online appendix depicts the parameter estimates.
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Starting with the tax data, columns (1) to (4) of Table 14 illustrate the progressive-
ness of the tax code, by depicting the distribution of gross and after-tax income, for
both individuals and households. It is worth noting that after-tax income is substan-
tially less unequal than gross income. The Gini coefficient, for instance, declines by
about 4 to 5 percentage points (from 0.42 to 0.38 for individuals and from 0.45 to 0.40
for households), and the 90th to 10th percentile ratio is reduced from 7.31 to 6.00 for
individuals and from 7.89 to 6.50 for households. Along the income distribution, the
income share of the top 20% gets reduced by around 4 percentage points as a result
of the tax, while the rest of quintiles experiment an increase in their income share.
In columns (5) to (8) of the same table, we present the after-tax income distribution
estimated in the survey data. We show the results for the two household definitions:
fiscal household (comprising the reference person and their spouse, in columns 5 and
6) and whole household (comprising all household members, in columns 7 and 8). As
mentioned above, the EFF provides income solely in gross terms. Hence, we make
use of the estimated GS function from the tax data to approximate the tax liabilities
faced by each household in the survey and then compute after-tax income. For the
definition of fiscal household, we apply the household tax function. For the whole
household definition, we apply the household tax function for the reference person
and their spouse, the individual function for the remaining household members, and
then we aggregate each member’s after-tax income at the household level. We find
that the estimated after-tax income distributions in the survey data are able to capture
the shift from the gross to net income distribution that we observed in the tax data.
Specifically, the first four quintiles experience an increase in their income share, while
the top 20% undergoes a reduction, the magnitude of the changes being similar to
those observed in the tax data.47 Hence, the application of the tax functions to the
survey data can provide a fruitful approach to analyze after-tax income in this type of
datasets, even if the actual information is missing.
In Tables 15 and 16 we report how gross and after-tax income inequality have
changed in recent years. In the individual data the Gini coefficient remains relatively
stable during the sample period, while there is an increase of the 90th to 10th and 50th
to 10th percentile ratios in the wake of the financial crisis, suggesting larger inequality
within taxpayers. This increase can be explained by the evolution of income shares
along the income distribution, which are depicted in Tables A.10 and A.11 in the
online appendix. In this respect, it is worth noting the income share decline of the
bottom 20% of taxpayers. Regarding the household tax data, while overall inequality,
as captured by the Gini index, seems to have increased in the run-up to the crisis and
decreased thereafter, the percentile ratios show somewhat the opposite trend, see Table
16.48
In Table 17 we depict the evolution of the household gross income distribution as
computed from the different waves of the EFF. They point to a rather stable distribution,
at least with respect to the selected inequality indices. Tables A.14 and A.15 in the
online appendix show the corresponding evolution in the gross and after-tax income
47 Note that the HSV function provides comparable results, see Table A.9 in the online appendix.
48 See also Tables A.12 and A.13 for the evolution of household gross and after-tax income shares during
the sample period, respectively.
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Table 15 Evolution of gross and after-tax income inequality indices in tax returns (individuals)
Quantiles 2003 2004 2007 2010 2013 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross income
Gini coefficient 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42
Var-log income 0.81 0.78 0.81 1.03 1.07 1.14
P90/P10 5.84 5.82 5.75 6.19 7.07 7.31
P50/P10 2.47 2.47 2.44 2.67 3.07 3.15
P90/P50 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.32 2.30 2.32
After-tax income
Gini coefficient 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.38
Var-log income 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.91 0.94 1.01
P90/P10 4.95 4.93 4.78 5.09 5.75 6.00
P50/P10 2.34 2.33 2.27 2.48 2.83 2.93
P90/P50 2.12 2.11 2.1 2.06 2.03 2.05
This table accounts for the overtime evolution of gross and after-tax income inequality indices, according
to the individual tax return data
Table 16 Evolution of gross and after-tax income inequality indices in tax returns (households)
Quantiles 2004 2007 2010 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gross income
Gini coefficient 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.45
Var-log income 0.91 0.94 1.18 1.10
P90/P10 7.45 7.23 7.64 7.89
P50/P10 2.65 2.65 2.85 3.00
P90/P50 2.81 2.73 2.68 2.63
After-tax income
Gini coefficient 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.40
Var-log income 0.81 0.82 1.06 0.97
P90/P10 6.30 6.09 6.40 6.50
P50/P10 2.50 2.45 2.63 2.75
P90/P50 2.52 2.49 2.44 2.36
This table accounts for the overtime evolution of gross and after-tax income inequality indices, according
to the tax return data aggregated by household
shares, respectively. Interestingly, the overtime pattern is comparable to that found in
the tax data (see Tables A.12 and A.13). Regarding gross income, the income share of
the top 20% in the survey data experienced an increase in the run-up to the financial
crisis, and a drop thereafter, while the following 20% followed the opposite pattern.
With respect to after-tax income, the evolution, as estimated with the GS function,
points toward larger income shares of the top 1% during 2004–2007 and a large
contraction during the financial crisis, while the top 20% underwent a decrease in
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Table 17 Evolution of gross and after-tax inequality indices in EFF (fiscal households)
Quantiles 2004 2007 2010 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gross income
Gini coefficient 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.44
Var-log income 0.75 0.68 0.78 0.70
P90/P10 7.13 7.44 7.40 7.48
P50/P10 2.72 2.94 2.67 2.73
P90/P50 2.62 2.53 2.77 2.74
After-tax income
Gini coefficient 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.39
Var-log income 0.66 0.58 0.67 0.58
P90/P10 6.04 6.26 6.16 6.10
P50/P10 2.57 2.75 2.51 2.54
P90/P10 2.35 2.27 2.45 2.40
This table depicts the overtime evolution of some inequality indices of gross and after-tax income as
estimated in the EFF. Households are defined as fiscal households, i.e., they include the reference person
and their spouse. Gross Income is directly observed in the EFF, while after-tax income is estimated by
applying the household GS tax function estimated in Sect. 5.5 to gross income
its income share in 2010–2013. Regarding the middle of the income distribution, it
renders a rather stable path, with some gains for the fourth quintile at the end of the
sample period.49
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we exploit a rich uncensored administrative dataset of tax returns for the
years 2002 to 2015 to present key facts about the Spanish Personal Income Tax system.
We focus on the distribution of gross income and its sources, taxable income, tax
benefits, tax liabilities and after-tax income, as well as effective average and marginal
tax rates. We do so for individuals and for households, defining the latter as either
joint declarations or as two individual declarations from the same household and
differentiate between single and married. We also briefly review how the PIT legislation
and the effective tax rates have changed during the period of the analysis.
A second contribution of the paper is the estimation of parametric functions of the
effective average tax rates that can be readily used in applied work. We follow two
different approaches. First, we estimate a single expression for the final tax liabilities
as a function of gross income. Second, we estimate three different functions, one for
the general tax rates that apply to the general taxable income, one for the savings
tax rates, applied to the savings taxable income, and one for the tax credits. Both
approaches generate a distribution of tax liabilities that is very close to the one we
observe in the data.
49 Using the HSV delivers similar results, see Table A.16 in the online appendix.
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